The future of African democracy now depends on local pockets and leaders
Africans will solve their own problems. But the loss of Western funding means local philanthropists, intellectuals and others need to put funds and quality time into civil society – and hurry it up
Augustine Magolowondo
President Donald Trump has dismantled United States foreign aid and profoundly disrupted the global ecosystem that supported democracy, human rights, public health, and poverty alleviation. Although it’s Trump’s cuts that have dominated attention, other Western countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands are also scaling back their aid commitments.
The broader Western world appears not only unable to compensate for the vacuum left by Washington but also happy to widen it.
Some commentators welcome this retreat, claiming it opens the door for Africa to assert its independence and chart a new course. They argue that it might catalyse a self-driven transformation — an African renaissance.
This is an exciting prospect.
But the risks of failure are substantial. The scale and suddenness of the cuts are kneecapping African civil society at a pivotal moment: authoritarianism on the continent is deepening, and international pressure on leaders to uphold democratic standards is weakening.
Backlash against solidarity
The inconsistency and hypocrisy of world powers have led many to overlook how international solidarity enabled African citizens to counter domestic authoritarianism. The transitions from one-party regimes and military dictatorships to pluralistic democracies in the 1990s were often driven by internal pro-democracy demands that had international support. Democracy was considered a shared global value and international support helped nurture domestic aspirations for it.
Take Malawi, where President Banda ran a three-decade dictatorship marked by human rights abuses. As domestic voices calling for reform grew louder, members of the Paris Club tipped the scales when they suspended aid over human rights abuses, weakening the regime’s finances. This led to a 1993 referendum, where Malawians overwhelmingly voted for multiparty democracy.
In that case, and many others, freedom was not imposed from the outside and democracy was not a “Western agenda”. African citizens worked with the international community, in joint commitment to political rights and civil liberties, to reshape the political culture on the continent.
Removing one half of this partnership could have dramatic consequences.
African activists may find that operating without international solidarity brings more government restrictions than ever. Authoritarian regimes on the other hand, already inspired by global democratic erosion, will be emboldened by the absence of external accountability and become more brazen at dismantling opposition, co-opting institutions, and shrinking civic space.
The victims of this rollback are not abstract ideals but ordinary people whose rights, voices, and aspirations are being eroded. Afrobarometer surveys consistently show that the desire for dignity, freedom, and accountable governance is deeply rooted in African societies.
Acknowledging external solidarity is not to say the international community deserves credit for African political resilience. Africans solved and will solve their problems. But success is a lot more likely and durable when they are not acting in isolation.
Malawi again offers an illustrative example. In the decades following the multiparty referendum, Malawians used US and European aid to strengthen the country’s democratic institutions.
Civil society initiatives supporting civic education, monitoring elections, and promoting government transparency sprung up and did the work.
These same groups, alongside a judiciary bolstered by international backing, were central in securing credible elections in 2019 and 2020.
Now, with pivotal elections approaching, the Trump-era aid cuts have left them underfunded and civic education efforts were scaled back or shut down. Political party development work, especially for women and youth participation, has stalled. That’s the environment in which Malawi’s next elections will happen.
Other donors may try to fill the gap, but piecemeal efforts won’t be enough if cuts persist.
Self-driven transformation
If an independent civil society is the goal, now is the time for African intellectuals, activists and civic leaders to invest their time and energy in building it. Recognising that everyone benefits when democracy thrives, African business leaders, philanthropists, and governments must finance the civil society that emerges after or survives the foreign aid cuts.
There must also be greater South-South cooperation. Global South countries that have made democratic progress should support others to achieve similar milestones.
There are rich lessons in democratic reform for cross-regional learning from Senegal, Ghana, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Malawi. Fostering peer learning and regional dialogue can strengthen local efforts and reduce dependency on outside validation.
The domestic/international alliances that delivered the democratic gains of the 1990s must now be rooted within Africa. Regional bodies and the African Union must recommit to democracy as a public good.
As authoritarian leaders grow more sophisticated and resourced, democracy needs new champions. Without them, the promise of greater independence may give way to a new form of control and exploitation.