Niger coup: The failures of West Africa’s political class paved the way for military takeovers
Niger’s coup is about more than one country. It speaks to a region where people are tired of the failures of the ruling class and their institutions.
Niger’s coup is about more than one country. It speaks to a region where people are tired of the failures of the ruling class and their institutions, along with the constant and pervasive lack of economic and societal security. Military leaders adept at exploiting these feelings saw the gap and made their move. Now the entire region’s future is in the balance.
For three weeks now, Niger’s lawfully elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, has been confined within the presidential complex by his own bodyguards. Days into Bazoum’s confinement, the commander of his presidential Guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, was announced as head of state.
With Tchiani’s junta announcing a 21-member cabinet and announcing they will be in power for at least three years, what started as a rumoured stand-off is now a complete coup d’etat. The army units that dashed into Niamey from Ouallam and Dosso did not save the elected government.
The putschists, under their umbrella of the CNSP — the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde la Patrie (National Council for the Salvation of the Fatherland), say they removed Bazoum because of the “continued worsening security situation’, “poor social and economic governance” – and for the “liberation of jihadists”.
At least one of the reasons given – the “worsening security situation” – does not stand up to scrutiny. As Bazoum said in his cry for help in a piece published by the Washington Post, his presidency improved security in Niger.
In the six months leading up to the coup there had been a 49% decrease in attacks on civilians and a 16% drop in fatalities related to such attacks, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location Event Database. In contrast, neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso, which have been under military rule during this time, continue to experience record levels of violent conflict.
This reduction in violence in Niger is all the more remarkable considering the levels of violence before and just after Bazoum took office. In his first two months, in February and March 2021, insurgents claiming ties to Islamic State killed 58 people in an attack on traders between Banibangou and Sinégodrar and another 137 when they attacked villagers and Malian refugees in Bakorat and Intazeyane. In the month just before Bazoum entered office, armed rebels killed 103 civilians in just one day in Tchoma Bangou and Zaroum Darey.
Even General Salifou Modi, Bazoum’s former army chief of staff – now second in command of the CNSP – acknowledged this progress in a speech not long before the coup.
He endorsed Bazoum’s counter-insurgency strategy, which was sold as including: Nigerien-led strong international military partnerships; dialogue and defection among the members of the Islamic State roaming the Malian border; and the re-engagement of the state in the vulnerable and marginalised border communities.
Ecowas vs the junta alliance
When the coup began, the first crowds that formed in Niamey called for the reinstatement of President Bazoum. They were quickly dispersed by gunshots fired by soldiers. But in the days that followed the tone of protests changed completely.
Massive demonstrations were held in Niamey by supporters of the coup, and opponents of Bazoum and his party, the Parti national pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme-Tarayya (PNDS-Tarayya).
Several national organisations, such as the Unité d’Actions Syndicales, the M62 movement, and the Syndicat National des Enseignants-Chercheurs du Supérieur came out in support of the coup. A massive protest at the end of July culminated with a riot at the French embassy.
This happened even as, perhaps precisely because, the coup d’état was being strongly condemned by outsiders including the West African regional bloc Ecowas, France and the United States.
On 30 July, regional bodies inflicted severe and non-targeted economic and financial sanctions against Nigerien residents. This was ECOWAS, the West Africa Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) and West African Central Bank (BCEAO) drawing a line. Ecowas also threatened the CNSP with a military intervention if Bazoum was not freed and reinstated by the following week.
On Thursday, 10 August — the same day the coup leaders released their cabinet list — the bloc warned that it had deployed a stand-by force to make good on the threat. If the attitude of the regional bloc has somewhat mellowed since then, with a mediation by Nigerian and Nigerien clerics/customary leaders before the CNSP, the initial reaction has so far defined the relations between the regional bloc and the military junta.
France condemned the coup immediately, called for the restoration of President Bazoum and affirmed their support towards ECOWAS’ approach.
The United States response has to call for the reinstatement of Bazoum while refraining from labelling the developments a coup. Its representatives appear willing to consider whichever solution allows it to maintain their military presence in Niger.
And ECOWAS doesn’t have all of West Africa’s support either. The countries run by soldiers who seized power, quickly came out in support of their counterparts in Niger.
In a joint statement, the leaders of Burkina Faso and Mali, two countries suspended from Ecowas due to earlier coups, declared their support. They also warned against a regional military intervention and said they would consider it to be a “declaration of war” against their two countries.
Guinea – also suspended from the bloc following a coup – sent a similar though tamer warning.
Pushback against colonial countries, and Ecowas
Antipathy towards Ecowas and Western powers has given rise to a wave of populist sentiment that favours the removal of heads of state associated with the West. This has served as a legitimising mechanism for all of the military takeovers, whether in Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), Burkina Faso (January and September 2022) and now Niger.
Within the region there is a general sense of disappointment in the handling by Ecowas of political challenges among its member-states.
The bloc is seen as not being proactive enough when political liberties are abused – reacting too late, if at all, when political conflicts lead to armed intervention.
In Côte d’Ivoire, President Alassane Ouattara proceeded to revise his country’s constitution to extend presidential term limits. In Senegal, the question of whether or not Macky Sall would stand for a third term cast a shadow over the political scene, contributing to protests which the police put down with lethal force amidst a clampdown on the press and opposition.
Such moves prompted barely a whisper of diplomatic protest, let alone outrage, from Ecowas over states who were undermining their internal democratic processes.
The contrasting response to the change of power in Niger – by heads of state that have abused their powers and constitutions, or stood idly by while these were being abused in neighbouring countries – has been noted by locals.
The dangers of continuity
One of marks used against Bazoum has been his promise of “continuity” and his inheritance of the legacy of his predecessor, Issoufou Mahamadou.
The last years of Mahamadou’s presidency were marked by a severe clampdown on liberties and on civil society organisations, activists and opposition politicians. Several civil society members were arrested and detained for long periods, often on flimsy charges. Political opponents were also silenced through the courts, which thinned the competition in the 2021 election that Bazoum would go on to win.
The proclamation of his victory was followed by several days of protests and vandalism in Niamey, during which the government shut down the internet and arrested nearly 470 people.
Critically, Issoufou – in response to the expanding insurgency in the tri-border region shared by Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – had built a strong military partnership with France, the USA, and other Western security actors.
This went as far as allowing the French and US militaries to operate in Niger broadly – and very openly.
While Bazoum tried to reset the government’s relations with the civil society, he maintained Issoufou’s security partnership with the US and France. When the latter were sent packing by Bamako and Ouagadougou, they moved their focus to Niamey.
Bazoum versus his junta neighbours
Relations between Bazoum and the leadership in Burkina Faso and Mali were acrimonious and added to the tension. In July 2021, Bazoum – infamous for his bluntness – was among the first heads of state to criticise the five colonels who led the coup in Mali, for “fleeing the battlefield and confining themselves to the AC’d room” in Bamako.
He said this during a joint press conference with President Emmanuel Macron at the Elysée Palace. The coup in Mali had taken place only a couple of months earlier and France was announcing the end of its operations in that part of the Sahel, which had been running since 2014.
The symbolism was remarkable.
Relations with Burkina Faso were no better; especially following last September’s coup led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré.
The tone was also acerbic from Bamako and Ouagadougou to Niamey. In a speech at the United Nations, Mali’s interim prime minister criticised Bazoum in harsh terms and questioned his Nigerien citizenship. This echoed conspiracy theories from the opposition against Bazoum, an Arab, in Hausa-Zarma majority Niger, that had circulated during the 2021 presidential elections.
From Ouagadougou, conspiracy theories spread via WhatsApp and social media platforms blamed Bazoum and the French forces based in Ayorou [in the Nigerien side of the tri-border region] for the massacre against civilians in Karma in May this year.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have since linked these psyops or misinformation campaigns to a special unit of the Burkinabè army.
A Sahelian problem
All this tension, national and regional, erupted following the coup on 26 July.
The reactions to the coup go beyond Bazoum or his party’s policies, and even Nigerien politics. They speak strongly of an impatience with the persisting insecurity in the Sahel (despite recent successes in Niger) and public disillusionment with the political class that emerged following the elections of the 1990s.
For the disillusioned, Ecowas – with its outdated political engagement and conflict resolution mechanisms – embodies that political class.
The Niger putschists, like those in Mali and Burkina Faso before them, are not ignorant of the prevailing sentiments and have harnessed them astutely. They have denounced military agreements with France and sanctions by Ecowas, and called for a patriotic mobilisation against “foreign” and “Western” aggression. And the streets in Niamey have responded with regular pro-putsch demonstrations and “patriotic vigils” at the capital’s roundabouts.
As the political deadlock continues, the future of Ecowas as a security and political actor is in the balance.