Goïta’s silencing of political voices strains Mali’s limits
Until the ban on political parties, expectations were high that 2025 would be the year Mali held elections.
Beverly Ochieng
The jury is still out on what military rule has done for or to general life in Mali, but its effect is undebatable in one aspect: public displays of disaffection. Demonstrations – including non-political ones – have steadily fallen from more than 170 in 2020 before General Assimi Goïta came to power to just 56 last year. So, when hundreds of Malians held an explicitly political rally in Bamako on 3 May, it was a momentous occasion. The government’s reaction proved that much
The rally at Palais de Culture was only the third public protest to demand for a return to constitutional order since Goïta took power in May 2021. This was not for want of protestable moments: elections initially scheduled for February 2024 never happened; military rule was extended to 2027; the junta cancelled a 2015 peace deal with separatists; and violent attacks by insurgents have expanded into west and south Mali. Bottled-up rage was palpable at the 3 May rally.
The protest was provoked by recommendations – from a rushed dialogue process that was boycotted by opposition parties in April – to dissolve political parties and elevate Goïta’s status, without an election, from interim leader to president for a five-year renewable term. The recommenders claimed that this would align Mali with the transition charters in the Alliance of Sahel States, a coalition with neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger where military rule was extended to 2029 and 2030 respectively. The cabinet approved the measures but, at the time of the rally, Parliament had not.
Hard clampdown
Security forces and young people dressed in the colours of the Malian flag disrupted the pro-democracy gathering at Palais de Culture, triggering calls for further protests on 9 May. This time, the government reacted pre-emptively: State security agents carried out a series of arrests, a tactic they have used increasingly to quell protests before they take place.
Alhassane Abba – the secretary-general of a political party called Convergence for the Development of Mali (Codem) and a former member of Parliament – was arrested at his home on 8 May. El Bechir Thiam, a young member of another party, Yelema, was arrested at a market.
Another Codem activist, Abdoul Karim Traoré, was arrested on 11 May while organising protests against the arrests of Abba and Thiam. Two other activists said they managed to evade security agents, while a leading figure of the pro-democracy movement, Chieck Oumar Diarra, who is already charged with “political disturbance”, was reportedly stabbed at his home.
On 9 May itself, the Parliament formally and indefinitely banned all political parties and their activities “to maintain public order”. Shortly afterwards, on 13 May, Goïta dissolved all political parties, effectively dismantling more than three decades of multi-party democracy.
Still, not everybody is sad about that. One activist group, Yerewolo, which campaigned for French and UN forces to leave Mali, has already acquiesced to the latest ban. Yerewolo is part of a new crop of activist groups that have sprung up during Gen. Goïta’s time to lend authenticity to calls for prolonged military rule.
Another notable group in this category is the Collective for the Defence of the Military, or CDM. Many public demonstrations of the past four years have been organised by groups like these, to show solidarity with the military government, supporting measures to restrict the media, civic and political space.
A vicious cycle of elite fears
Until the ban on political parties, expectations were high that 2025 would be the year Mali held elections.
Some funds for the electoral process were allocated in the national budget last September, and several opposition activists were freed from jail in October. In February, the electoral commission completed its revision of the voters’ roll. These were all signs that politics might return to normal. The latest star to align was in a March survey by Afrobarometer: nearly half of Malians said they would vote for Goïta if an election was held. What better time than now?
However, power struggles within Goïta’s inner circle appear to be in a deadlock. The five coup leaders, including Goïta, seem unable to agree on who among them will vie for the presidency. Military setbacks in the north and the expansion of militant activity to the south and west have added to the disagreements. And despite outward shows of unity, Goïta and his defence minister, General Sadio Camara, are said to be at odds.
When the putschists mark the fourth anniversary of Goïta’s coup within a coup next Saturday, the air will be thick with suspicion. Not far from anyone’s mind will be the possibility that a faction amongst them might exploit the current resurgence of pro-democracy demands to stage another “intervention”.
When the putschists mark the fourth anniversary of Goïta’s coup within a coup next Saturday, the air will be thick with suspicion. Not far from anyone’s mind will be the possibility that a faction amongst them might exploit the current resurgence of pro-democracy demands to stage another “intervention”.
That fear could then manifest as even more control of the political space.
Having cleaved the country from the political oversight of peers in the regional bloc Ecowas, the military government has only itself, its friends among the Sahel states, and perhaps this resurging pro-democracy movement to regulate its actions.